Neutrality

I

Introduction

Neutrality, in international law, legal status of a state that adheres to a policy of nonengagement during war. The rules covering wartime relations between a neutral and a belligerent were formulated largely in response to situations that developed during the limited conflicts of the 18th and 19th centuries. One of the first clear formulations of a doctrine of neutrality was embodied in two early U.S. documents: the proclamation of neutrality issued by George Washington in 1793 and the American Neutrality Code of 1794. A landmark document relating to the maritime relations of neutrals and belligerents was the Declaration of Paris, issued in 1856. The rights and duties of neutrals were codified in the 5th and 13th Hague conventions of 1907 and in the Declaration of London of 1908, which, however, was not ratified.

II

Rules of Neutrality

The complicated rules of neutrality are based, for the most part, on two deceptively simple assumptions, namely, that a neutral state, being neither judge nor party in the conflict, must show impartiality in its dealings with belligerents on both sides, and that belligerents must respect the sovereignty of neutral states. Accordingly, throughout a war, neutral states continue diplomatic intercourse with all belligerent states. A neutral state may not give armed assistance to any belligerent, or lend money, or guarantee a loan to either side, or permit its territory to become a base for hostile operations. Although it may permit the innocent passage of belligerent vessels through its territorial waters, it is expected to intern belligerent troops and aircraft that enter its jurisdiction.

These rules apply to the relations of belligerents and neutral governments. The relations of belligerents to private citizens of neutral states involve greater difficulties. Neutral governments are expected to prevent their citizens from fitting out military expeditions in neutral territory, and they may not protect their citizens from penalties incurred from committing unneutral acts. Neutral governments are not obliged to restrain their citizens from selling war supplies or lending money to belligerents if the citizens have the same legal right to trade with both sides. A belligerent, moreover, is not prohibited from attempting to intercept such commerce between neutrals and its enemy. On the high seas, belligerents have the right to stop and search neutral vessels and to capture them if there is evidence that they are carrying contraband to the enemy, breaking a blockade, or engaging in unneutral service. On a neutral vessel only contraband is liable to confiscation although other goods on board may be owned by a belligerent citizen. If more than half the cargo on a neutral vessel (as measured by value or freight, volume or weight) consists of contraband, the neutral vessel itself may be condemned. Condemnation of a neutral vessel or cargo, however, must always be settled by adjudication in a prize court, which may award damages to the owner if the evidence is insufficient to show “probable cause” for capture. A belligerent may also proclaim a blockade of enemy ports. If such a blockade is effective, the belligerent may capture, and the prize court may condemn, neutral ships that are seeking to leave or enter blockaded ports.

Neutrals and belligerents often disagree regarding the interpretation of these rules. Neutral countries have usually advocated a very limited definition of contraband and the least possible interference with their shipping by insisting that their vessels may not be taken into port for search, that “probable cause” for capture must be found by search at sea, and above all, that their vessels must not be sunk. Belligerents have tended to favor a broad definition of contraband and to interpret their rights to intercept neutral commerce as including not only ships bound for enemy ports but also, under the doctrine of “continuous voyage,” ships bound for neutral ports and carrying goods that may ultimately be received by an enemy. They have also held that if it is impossible to take a vessel liable to capture to one of their ports, they may take it to a neutral port for internment, or sink it, providing passengers and crew are put in a place of safety. During the two world wars, for example, Britain defined almost every conceivable type of commodity as contraband and asserted the right to intercept neutral ships going from one neutral port to another if statistical or other evidence indicated that cargo carried by the ship might be destined for its enemy. In view of the difficulties of searching large ships at sea and the danger of enemy submarines, neutral ships were often taken into port for search. Germany, being unable to rival the success of the British navy in intercepting ships and enforcing a blockade of enemy ports, and being unable to bring captured vessels to port because all its ports were blockaded, responded to the British policy with submarine warfare, even sinking enemy and suspected neutral vessels at sight. As a neutral during the early stages of both world wars, the U.S. objected to such practices of Germany and Britain, and German violation of neutral rights, especially the sinking of enemy vessels carrying American passengers, was a major cause of U.S. entry into World War I. In reaction to the Italo-Ethiopian war as well as the impending threat of World War II, Congress passed a series of neutrality acts between 1935 and 1937. Among other provisions, these laws placed an embargo on exports of war matériel to belligerents, warned American citizens that they could not expect protection if they traveled on belligerent ships or in war zones, prohibited loans to belligerents, and instituted the so-called cash-and-carry policy that specified that a belligerent could only obtain raw materials from the U.S. if it paid for them on delivery and carried them on its own vessels. Soon after the outbreak of World War II Congress repealed the arms embargo, and in 1940 the other provisions of the neutrality acts were repealed or bypassed so that aid might be provided to Britain in the form of arms shipments, and under Lend-Lease, justified on the ground that German aggressions violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact and relieved the U.S. of the normal neutral duty of impartiality.

---

---

III

Alternatives to Neutrality

The virtually complete breakdown of neutrality that marked the two world wars reflected changes in the nature of warfare and the growing economic interdependence of nations throughout the world. During the two world wars vast quantities of munitions, vehicles, equipment of all kinds, and other goods were required, and productive capacity became crucial to victory. Economic targets were as important as military targets, warfare covered entire nations, and weapons became increasingly destructive and difficult to control, thus increasing the likelihood that neutral citizens and property might be harmed. At the same time the flow of trade from neutral nations became vitally important to the survival of most of the belligerent nations. Just as every belligerent was determined to protect its own flow of trade, so also was it anxious to disrupt the foreign trade of its enemies by any possible means. With the development of atomic weapons, moreover, neutrality in any form became increasingly impractical.

Alternatives to neutrality already in existence after World War I included an agreement in the Covenant of the League of Nations that league members should take collective action against any nation that violated its covenant obligations to refrain from hostilities until the league had had nine months to attempt a settlement, or had violated the territorial integrity or political independence of a nation within the league. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, to which nearly all nations including the United States were parties, went further by prohibiting war as an instrumental policy and requiring peaceful settlement of international disputes or conflicts. Although the outlawing of war and the principle of collective action broke down in such crises as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Italo-Ethiopian war, these ideas were revived and amplified in the charter of the United Nations after World War II. United Nations military forces were used to oppose aggression in the Korean War and in other regional wars of the 1950s and '60s. Such action could not be used, however, to restrain illegal action by a major power that had a veto in the Security Council, particularly the major nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In their conduct of foreign policy during the third quarter of the 20th century, both these nations showed an awareness of the need to prevent a nuclear war by mutual deterrence and to seek ways to limit the production and possession of highly destructive weapons. In areas where these nations or their allies developed conflicting interests, they sometimes agreed in principle to accords guaranteeing the neutrality of such areas, a practice that had been observed in the past by the impartiality of Switzerland and other areas.

	More from Encarta
	•  7 tips for funding an online degree •  How to succeed in the fashion industry without being a top designer •  Presidential Myths Quiz •  Coffee break: Recharge your brain