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Roundup: Media's Take

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This is where we excerpt articles from the media that take a historical approach to events in the news.

SOURCE: Washington Monthly (5-11-12)

Ed Kilgore is a contributing writer to the Washington Monthly. He is is managing editor for The Democratic Strategist, a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, and a Special Correspondent for The New Republic.

One of the truly interesting things about the reaction to the president’s announcement of support for same-sex marriage (sorry if it annoys anyone that I’m writing about this yet again, but it is the dominant story of this week, affecting nearly every other political “story”), particularly among those who were pleased with it, is the constant alteration between narratives emphasizing its highly tactical and perhaps even accidental nature, and narratives placing it as extraordinarily important—even magnificent—from the perspective of history. This is particularly noticeable among LGBT writers, who often seem to pause in the midst of analyzing the event dispassionately or even cynically, to marvel at how it has affected them....

I’d observe that this isn’t the first, or second, time that a complicated progressive politician took a historic step in a calculated way from what might be at least partially interpreted as mixed motives. The Emancipation Proclamation, after all, contradicted years of prior statements by Lincoln that he never intended, even after the beginning of war, to tamper with slavery in its southern homeland. He got to his ultimate position in no small part, moreover, because he was convinced it would help win the war. But he also knew he was making history, and did.



SOURCE: The New Republic (5-11-12)

Jonathan Rauch is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and author of Gay Marriage: Why It Is Good for Gays, Good for Straights, and Good for America.

...Obama’s gay-marriage conversion smacks of conviction, not convenience. Waiting until after the election would have been politically safer, but if Obama loses in November, as he knows he might, a historic opportunity to speak out for justice could have slipped away. President Clinton has said he regrets having signed the Defense of Marriage Act. Obama seems to have decided not to repeat the error.

“We shall overcome,” LBJ said in March of 1965, shortly after his reelection. When he said those words, he knew he was writing himself into the history books. But he also knew he would probably be writing off the South. There’s no doubt that Obama is a more cautious politician than Johnson: If he thought helping gays would have cost him the election, he wouldn’t have done it—and gays wouldn’t have wanted him to. And the political risk he is taking is not of the same magnitude as LBJ’s. The country has come far enough on marriage equality to make a stand on principle affordable. African-American equality was unique in its moral importance and political voltage, so Johnson’s gesture continues to stand as unique, and, we must hope, always will.

Still, Obama has claimed for himself a place in gay history not unlike LBJ’s place in black history. He is the first U.S. president to put the federal government unequivocally on the side of full equality for gay Americans, and he will almost surely be the last Democratic president to have opposed full equality. For his party, for its liberal base, and possibly for the country, there is no going back. He has crossed the bridge from Selma.



SOURCE: NYT (5-10-12)

Natalie Bakopoulos is the author of the novel “The Green Shore.”

FORTY-FIVE years ago, on April 21, 1967, a right-wing group of colonels seized power in Greece. Tanks rolled into the center of Athens; politicians, artists and journalists were arrested; and the ensuing military dictatorship lasted for seven years.

Decades after the restoration of democracy, we are again hearing echoes of the junta and its aftermath. Nationalistic slogans are uttered by right and left. The rising phoenix — the colonels’ emblem — has been featured on some candidate posters for the far-right-wing party Golden Dawn, and its leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, has glorified the period. It would be easy to dismiss him as a fringe voice were it not for the fact that his party gained parliamentary representation in last weekend’s elections for the first time. It gathered votes from the traditional supporters of the junta and the political right, but it was also the second most popular party among young voters.

It’s clear that Greeks — derided throughout the Continent as lazy and corrupt, hobbled by the bailout deal’s austerity measures and humiliated by the troika (the European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund) — have put their trust outside the mainstream....



SOURCE: NYT (5-10-12)

Husain Haqqani, a professor at Boston University, was Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011.

ON the anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s death last week, Pakistan was the only Muslim country in which hundreds of demonstrators gathered to show solidarity with the dead terrorist figurehead.

Yet rather than asking tough questions about how Bin Laden had managed to live unmolested in Pakistan for years, the Pakistani Supreme Court instead chose to punish the prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, by charging him with contempt for failing to carry out the court’s own partisan agenda — in this case, pressuring the Swiss government to reopen a decades-old corruption investigation of President Asif Ali Zardari. (Never mind that Swiss officials say they are unlikely to revisit the charges.)...

In Pakistan, most of the debate about Bin Laden has centered on how and why America violated Pakistan’s sovereignty by unilaterally carrying out an operation to kill him. There has been little discussion about whether the presence of the world’s most-wanted terrorist in a garrison town filled with army officers was itself a threat to the sovereignty and security of Pakistan....



SOURCE: American Spectator (5-10-12)

Peter B. Doran is senior policy analyst at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and P. Bracy Bersnak is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Economics at Christendom College.

These are rough days for the European Union (EU). What began as a sovereign debt crisis has now metastasized into a political debacle for the leaders left holding the bag. Nicolas Sarkozy's electoral defeat in France, the ouster of an austerity-minded government in Greece; and last month's collapse of the governing coalition in the Netherlands are all symptoms of a deeper problem for Europe: bloated governments are hard to tame, even when there is no money left to pay for them.

This is bad news for Europe. But the political tumult on the continent is also a stunning vindication of the post-War thinkers who anticipated this outcome. These individuals, men like Friedrich von Hayek and Wilhelm Röpke, would become founding intellectual fathers behind the modern conservative movement in Europe and the United States. Even today, their foresight provides a defining roadmap for navigating away from Europe's current crisis and offers a chilling warning to the United States about repeating the same mistakes.

Much like the debt crisis of our own time, the dimensions of Europe's post-War reconstruction were staggering. Only instead of ruined factories and decimated cities, today's contemporary European leaders must contend with bombed out credit ratings and the herculean task of reordering the continent's dysfunctional economies. Then, as now, the basic policy debate centered on the state's role as guarantor of public prosperity and welfare; and perhaps more importantly, how to finance it.



SOURCE: PunditWire (5-7-12)

Dan Whitman teaches Foreign Policy at the Washington Semester Program, American University. As Public Diplomacy officer in USIA and the Department of State for more than 25 years, he drafted and edited speeches for U.S. ambassadors in Denmark, Spain, South Africa, Cameroon, Haiti, and Guinea-Conakry. A senior Foreign Service Officer, he retired in 2009 from the Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

Ten of us had Vernon Walters to ourselves, in a location in Scandinavia. Even he never predicted exactly what would happen later that year, but in 1989 he brought us fresh news of subtle changes affecting East-West relations. He’d been sent as President Reagan’s ambassador to something called the Federal Republic of Germany, which no longer exists.

He was bewilderingly smart. He’d never been to college. He spoke perfect French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Russian, and passable German. Everyone who ever met him had a Walters story. He was “General,” or “Ambassador,” depending on where he was at the time.

Talking as always without notes, he gave us updates and also reminded us of things we already half knew. Too smart for optimism, he proceeded willfully and sketched a working plan for straightening out the edges and angles of a fizzling conflict. He never said it would be settled soon. He was of the Ramrod School, figuring how to face the Soviet Union down at its own game.

Sometimes during a 90-minute brief, the listener wants to consider response, question, reflection, assimilation. None of that was called for with Walters: even the political counselor in the room settled back with a primary school receptivity. Dispute and refinement were pointless....



SOURCE: The American Prospect (5-10-12)

Garrett Epps is the legal affairs editor of The American Prospect. He is a former reporter for The Washington Post and a professor of law at the University of Baltimore. His most recent book is Democracy Reborn: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Fight for Equal Rights in Post-Civil War America.

Is anybody else as depressed as I am about the next four years? 

No matter who wins, we face the prospect of bitterly divided government, savage partisanship in Congress, and increasing executive desperation....

The Framers did not foresee the rise of a two-party system. As a result, the Constitution (unlike most twentieth-century constitutions) makes no provisions for party participation in government, or party accountability in policy. But their vision of disinterested, dispassionate demigods soberly debating the public good barely survived the Washington administration; the Founding generation itself descended into partisan warfare that compares in vitriol with what we face today. No amount of wishing will make party polarization go away—as Senator Richard Lugar learned this week. And amending the Constitution to tie parties more closely to responsibility would be a chancy and dangerous process....



SOURCE: NYT (5-3-12)

Lee Siegel is the author, most recently, of “Harvard Is Burning.”

ARTHUR MILLER’s “Death of a Salesman,” now on Broadway in a Tony-nominated revival — and starring a heart-shattering Philip Seymour Hoffman as a Willy Loman for the ages — is the most devastating portrait of punctured middle-class dreams in our national literature. Yet as I sat through a recent performance, I wondered why the play was revived at all.

While “Death of a Salesman” has consolidated its prestige as an exposure of middle-class delusions, the American middle class — as a social reality and a set of admirable values — has nearly ceased to exist.

Certainly few middle-class people, or at least anyone from any “middle class” that Loman would recognize, are among the audiences attending this production. What was once a middle-class entertainment has become a luxury item. Tickets for the original run, in 1949, cost between $1.80 and $4.80; tickets for the 2012 run range from $111 to $840. After adjusting for inflation, that’s a 10-fold increase, well beyond the reach of today’s putative Willy Lomans....



SOURCE: WaPo (5-8-12)

Richard Cohen writes a weekly political column that appears on Tuesdays .

Barack Obama has read and been influenced by Robert A. Caro’s classic biography of Robert Moses, “The Power Broker.” From the evidence, it is far from clear, though, that the president has read Caro’s other books, the latest being the fourth installment of his massive Lyndon B. Johnson biography — “The Passage of Power.” He should immediately read it. It will teach him how to be president.

Maybe I should have written that it will teach him how to be a better president. Where Johnson was strong and unparalleled — personal relationships with much of Washington — Obama is frighteningly weak. Last week I asked a member of the Senate if he knows of anyone who really knows Obama. He said he does not.

Washington is thick with stories about Obama’s insularity and distance. We hear how he does not listen to criticism — he sometimes just walks out of the room — and how he sticks to a tight circle of friends. His usual weekly golf game is mostly limited to the same people — and when he played a round with House Speaker John Boehner(R-Ohio), it was treated as an exceptional event. When, for whatever reason, Politico analyzedObama’s golf outings (June 6, 2011), it found that Obama’s “golf circle has actually gotten much tighter over the past 21/ 2years” — none of them politicians or, heaven forbid, journalists.

Lyndon Johnson, in contrast, would not think of wasting a golf game on the game itself…



SOURCE: American Spectator (5-7-12)

Rishawn Biddle the editor of Dropout Nation, is co-author of A Byte at the Apple: Rethinking Education Data for the Post-NCLB Era.

Mitt Romney has never been known for taking strong stances on the issues. But he has proven to be even more artfully dodgy than usual on the matter of federal education policy -- and the debate over whether or not to reform America's woeful public schools. As part of his effort to woo movement conservatives displeased with George W. Bush's legacy as centrist Democrats' favorite Republican on education (and longing for halcyon days of federal nonintervention that never were), Romney has avoided mentioning education in his 87-page economic plan; backed away from his support of Bush's signature legislation. the No Child Left Behind Act; and even backpedalled from his praise of President Barack Obama's Race to the Top school Reform competition after being criticized by equally double-talking Texas Gov. Rick Perry.
 
As left-footed in his dodging as the former Massachusetts governor has been, he has still managed to confuse otherwise-astute reformers and commentators. Time columnist Andy Rotherham, whose Eduwonk site is one of the go-to sites on school reform, declared the other week that Romney is now to "the political right of President George W. Bush" on education policy; while Fox News commentator Juan Williams suggested last week that Romney should pick Condoleezza Rice as his running mate because of her work with former New York City schools chancellor Joel Klein on a Council on Foreign Relations report advocating for school choice and Common Core national reading and math standards.
 
But like so much with Romney, what you think you see isn't always what it real. This is especially true when it comes to education. A closer look at his advisers, along with his actual record in Massachusetts, reveals that his tenure as president would more-likely resemble that of still-reviled Dubya (and even the current school reformer-in-chief) than either movement conservatives or teachers' unions will like. And for children stuck attending failing schools -- and the taxpayers picking up the tab to the tune of $591 billion a year -- this is not a bad thing...


SOURCE: National Review (5-7-12)

Matthew Shaffer lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

When President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner initiated the nationalization and expropriation of the Argentine assets of YPF, an oil company owned mostly by Spanish interests, it came as no surprise to anyone who has visited the country recently or watched it closely. The theft, a consistent manifestation of the Kirchner personality and the mercurial character of the Argentine political class, was more a return to business as usual for the country than a shock — and goes a long way toward explaining why Argentina is poor.

In January 1912, an impartial observer of Argentina and the United States would have had trouble guessing which had a more promising future. Both enjoyed the low-hanging fruit of abundant, underpopulated land. The Argentine pampas were as fecund, tillable, and flat as the American Midwest. Argentina had a long coastline ideal for exporting the agricultural products that were grown inland. Immigrants from all over the world were rushing in. Argentina had one major advantage over the States: It had never relied so heavily on slavery for agriculture. So it had never experienced such a wrenching civil war, nor was it destined for the racial strife and inequality that would be the major blot on America’s future. By 1912, Argentina had even started to enjoy some soft power: The tango — which had originated in Buenos Aires’ slums — had just hit Paris and would soon be the rage in New York and Finland. The capital was marketing itself as a fully European city transplanted directly into the Americas.

In January 2012, I caught a flight to Buenos Aires with a cheap Air Canada ticket, a psychological desperation for more sunlight than Boston would enjoy until April, and a vague curiosity about why Argentina, which had once so resembled the United States, was now so different. What had happened in the intervening 100 years?...

If you want a one-word answer to the question “Why isn’t Argentina rich?” your best bet is coups. Between 1930 (when, only a year after Black Thursday, Argentina’s future may have looked even brighter than America’s) and 1976, Argentina endured at least six. Until 1930, its per capita GDP had closely tracked that of countries like New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. But constant political instability in the decades that followed threw Argentina off track. The reasons are basic: When a country is unstable, it is risky to make the long-term investments required for growth. When dictators and oligarchs use the economy to reward their friends and punish their enemies, markets can’t guide the structural evolution and modernization of the economy. Political revolutions leave a country economically retrograde. By 2000, Argentina’s per capita GDP was about a quarter of that of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. It had largely missed the boat of the 20th century’s spectacular growth....



SOURCE: American Spectator (5-3-12)

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and the Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution at the Institute on Religion and Public Policy. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Beyond Good Intentions: A Biblical View of Politics (Crossway).

North Korea is, to put it mildly, a "problem." The so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea devotes much of its time to threatening other nations. Pyongyang spends money that it doesn't have on nuclear weapons, missiles, and bizarrely choreographed and synchronized propaganda ceremonies. It has pioneered a system of monarchical communism, passing power from one idiot son to another.

Worse, at least for the North Korean People, the DPRK has created a genuine gulag state, with a smaller but still murderous "gulag archipelago," as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn famously called Joseph Stalin's creation. The most important political challenge facing Washington remains the North's nuclear program. But the ultimate objective is to relax Pyongyang's grip over the suffering population.

That the DPRK is repressive is hardly news. However, it is difficult for anyone in the West to imagine the full extent of repression in the North....

The DPRK was a Cold War creation, established after Japan's surrender in World War II left the Korean peninsula divided between hostile U.S. and Soviet client states. Moscow tapped Kim Il-sung to run the Soviet zone, which became formally independent in 1948. Kim learned well from Stalin, out-maneuvering internal opponents to win supreme power and creating a system of pervasive social control to terrorize the population. Kim's horrifying twist to Stalin's style was to punish three generations of a family for the "crimes" of any member. Children, parents, and grandparents routinely ended up in the North Korean gulag....



SOURCE: American Spectator (5-3-12)

Most characteristic of this preaching [of the Great Leap Forward] was its utopianism, the promise of a bright future just in the offing, "three years of suffering leading to a thousand years of happiness." -- Franz Schurmann writing in Ideology and Organization in Communist China

Forward!

Comrades, you can't make it up. Can you say "campaign blunder"? Or is it a blunder? Is it deliberate? The socialist mind at work in campaign mode?

The Obama campaign has picked a portion of one of the most infamous socialist slogans of 20th century history to use as its own new campaign slogan.

"Forward" is the new Obama slogan, Team Obama borrowing boldly from none other than the late Communist Party of China leader Chairman Mao.

Mao's slogan? "The Great Leap Forward."...



SOURCE: NYT (5-5-12)

John Noble Wilford, a former senior science correspondent for The Times, writes about archaeology.

Since the discovery of his richly furnished tomb in 1922, Tutankhamen has ascended to an afterlife no pharaoh in ancient Egypt’s 3,000-year civilization could have imagined. His reign was brief, circa 1336-1327 B.C. Historians had previously known so little about him that they were not sure if he had died young or come to the throne as an old man. But the sight of his golden death mask provoked a media frenzy, and the wild conjecture has continued down to our time of high-tech studies of the Tut mummy.

Today, Tut the boy king — about 18 at death — is the superstar of museum and touring exhibitions, one of antiquity’s celebrities, sharing a firmament with the likes of Nefertiti and the ever lusty Cleopatra. Indeed, he is so much a celebrity that Joyce Tyldesley, an Egyptologist at the University of Manchester who wrote a biography of Cleopatra four years ago, says that for some aloof colleagues, confessing an interest in Tutankhamen is “the equivalent to confessing a preference for television soaps over Shakespeare.” Nonetheless, she evidently believes the moment right for a book rethinking the Tutankhamen craze and assessing new biological and archaeological evidence for perspective on his place in Egyptian history. In “Tutankhamen: The Search for an Egyptian King,” Tyldesley has written a crisp, well-researched account of emerging insights into both the life and times of the young king and the modern response, nonsense and all, to his resurrection, as it were, in the modern world.

One part is an archaeologist’s sympathetic review of the luck, hard work and frustration associated with the tomb discovery by Howard Carter, the British excavator bankrolled by a lord, the Earl of Carnarvon. On one “last gamble” in the Valley of the Kings, workers clearing rubble near a known tomb uncovered steps down to another and, as Carter wrote, “made a discovery that far exceeded our wildest dreams.” Tyldesley retells the familiar story with spirit, and with closer attention than usual to each revealing step, including the mistakes, setbacks and dealings with the press....



SOURCE: NYT (5-5-12)

William J. Broad is a science reporter for The New York Times who has written extensively about nuclear weapons.

“IT’S a boy,” Edward Teller exulted after the world’s first hydrogen bomb exploded in 1952 with a force 1,000 times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

From the start, the nuclear era seethed with sexual allusions. Military officers joked about the phallic symbolism of their big missiles and warheads — and of emasculating the enemy. “Dr. Strangelove” mocked the idea with big cigars and an excited man riding into the thermonuclear sunset with a bomb tucked between his legs.

Helen Caldicott, the antinuclear activist, argued in the 1980s that male insecurity accounted for the cold war’s perilous spiral of arms. Her book? “Missile Envy.”

Today, the psychosexual lens helps explain why North Korea, in addition to dire poverty and other crippling woes, faces international giggles over its inability to “get it up” — a popular turn of phrase among bloggers and some headline writers.

“Things like this never go away,” Spencer R. Weart, an atomic historian and director emeritus of the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics, said in an interview. “There’s little doubt that missiles are phallic symbols. Everybody agrees on that.”...



SOURCE: The Fiscal Times (5-4-12)

Bruce Bartlett is a columnist and blogger for The Fiscal Times.

The most talked-about article in Washington this week is the one by political scientists Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein blaming political polarization and gridlock on the Republican Party. They say that its breech of longstanding norms of political competition, especially routine use of the filibuster in the Senate, has gone over the line. Mann and Ornstein blame the extreme rightward tilt of the GOP for its destructive behavior.

The political scientist Jonathan Bernstein agrees that the Republicans have moved well to the right and have become more radical in pursuit of their agenda. But he argues that these are two different phenomena that are not necessarily related. Bernstein thinks the GOP has simply become dysfunctional. He points to the purging of conservatives such as Senators Robert Bennett of Utah and Richard Lugar of Indiana merely for being insufficiently aggressive in attacking Democrats.

The roots of political polarization go back to before the Civil War. The slaveholding society of the old South necessarily imposed upon it a very conservative view of the world, which impacts public policy to the present day.

One way in which this conservatism exhibited itself and still does is that Southerners tend to be very religious in an evangelical Christian way. The reason for this is that when slavery came under attack by Northern abolitionists, Southerners found comfort in the Bible. In it there are many passages that defend slavery and treat it as a normal part of life (e.g., Exodus 20: 20-21; Ephesians 6:5; Colossians 3: 22)....



SOURCE: Guardian (UK) (5-3-12)

William Shawcross's most recent book is Allies: the United States, Britain, Europe and the War in Iraq.

The real question raised by Tom Watson's self-regarding assertion about Rupert Murdoch's "fitness" to run a media company is whether Watson himself (and those MPs who voted with him) are themselves fit for purpose. We usually criticise foreign politicians or governments when they try to interfere with their free press. Watson wants to do the same; he wants Murdoch to be divested of his company.
 
This is not a matter of principle. Through all the long years (too long, in my view) of the Sun's support for Blair and Brown, Watson and his friends made no such complaints. But in 2009 Brown, as we know, was enraged when the Sun switched to the Conservatives. According to Andrew Neil and Murdoch himself, he vowed revenge on Murdoch's company. This is it. Watson is the instrument of Brown's fury – he is fiercely partisan, not fiercely principled.
 
There is no question that serious wrongdoing took place at the News of the World, both in the original hacking and in the company's failure to pursue and reveal what went wrong. Rupert and James Murdoch have each acknowledged that; they and the company and many of those who work for it are paying a terrible price for these failures. Those who hate Murdoch will have simple reactions: "Serves him right" and "About time too".
 
Hatred of Murdoch is a fierce and, in my view, corrosive emotion. Nothing I say will alleviate it. But here goes: Rupert Murdoch has been the bravest and most radical media owner in Britain in the last 40 years...


SOURCE: National Review (5-3-12)

Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

The “fog of war” is a concept derived from the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, the great 19th-century Prussian military theorist who recognized that those leading troops into battle often lack data, perspective, and situational awareness. Enveloped within this “fog of uncertainty,” they may not know whether they are winning or losing, and they may take actions that weaken their position and strengthen their enemies. 
 
Would Clausewitz not be fascinated by the war dominating the 21st century, a conflict so murky we can’t even agree on its name? Is it the “War on Terrorism” or the “Long War” or the “War Against al-Qaeda” or just “Overseas Contingency Operations”?
 
Over at Foggy Bottom — an apt nickname if ever there was one — an unnamed “senior State Department official” told National Journal’s Michael Hirsh that “the War on Terror is over.” He (or she?) elaborated: “Now that we have killed most of al-Qaeda, . . . people who once might have gone into al-Qaeda see an opportunity for a legitimate Islamism.” A White House spokesman later issued a “clarification”: “We absolutely have never said our war against al-Qaeda is over. We are prosecuting that war at an unprecedented pace.”
 
Both statements miss — if not the elephant in the room — the guerillas in the mist...


SOURCE: TIME (5-2-12)

Tony Karon is a senior editor at TIME, where he has covered international conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and the Balkans since 1997.

To understand the historical significance of President Barack Obama’s visit to Afghanistan on Tuesday, imagine that President Richard Nixon had, in the spring of 1972, flown to Saigon to signal American voters that the Vietnam war was coming to an end — and to ink a deal with President Nguyen Van Thieu codifying a long-term U.S. relationship with the Republic of South Vietnam, which would shortly be left responsible for its own security. “Today, I signed a historic agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that defines a new kind of relationship between our countries – a future in which Afghans are responsible for the security of their nation, and we build an equal partnership between two sovereign states; a future in which the war ends, and a new chapter begins,” Obama said Tuesday.  Nixon might have said something similar on that imaginary 1972 visit. Except, of course, everyone knew that Vietnam’s future would not be defined by an agreement between Washington and Thieu, as much as by the one signed in Paris, two months after Nixon’s reelection, between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, representing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (a.k.a. “North Vietnam”). Even that deal collapsed, of course, with the DRV and its supporters in the south finishing off the Thieu regime 19 months after U.S. troops withdrew.
 
Any deal between Presidents Obama and Karzai premised on the ability of the current political order in Kabul to protect itself independently of foreign troops is hardly likely to be the last word, pleasing as the spectacle may be for presidential campaign purposes. The key — but by no means the only — conversation shaping Afghanistan’s future will be the one conducted on the battlefield, and at the negotiating table, between the U.S., its Afghan interlocutors and the Taliban. That point seemed to be underscored by a Taliban car bomb attack near U.S. bases in Kabul just hours after Obama’s departure, which served as a counterpoint to the President’s insistence in his speech that the insurgents’ momentum has been broken. Sure, the U.S. has made important tactical gains against the Taliban in designated operational areas in southwestern Afghanistan, but tactical gains in an expeditionary counterinsurgency war tend to be just that; the insurgents know that, as Henry Kissinger famously put it, guerrilla armies win by not losing. They know that the civilian population has little faith in Western forces or in the government those forces protect, and they know the U.S. and its allies are seeking an expeditious exit from Afghanistan. The brutal truth of the Afghanistan equation is that time is still on the side of the Taliban...


In a recent New York Times article Susanne Güsten described the difficulties that Syriac Christians faced throughout the history of Republican Turkey. This story reflects the traumatic consequences of the nation-building process that modern Turkey has experienced since the 1920s and 1930s. The Turkish official national identity was based on the ideology of Kemalism, which idealized a homogenous society defined by secularism and nationalism. This ideal, which has been alien to diversity, made life very difficult for ethnic and religious minorities.

Turkish secularism, in contrast to the American experience of secularism that separated religion and the state, excluded religion from the public sphere and aimed to keep it under state control. In an aim to distance itself from the Ottoman Muslim past, the state took a hostile position against religion. It banned organizing around religion. Even today, all religious associations, including Muslim ones, do not exist legally. Related to this, the state does not allow religious education outside of the state domain. The state itself took the responsibility to teach a Hanefi/Sunni interpretation of Islam. The motive of the “secular” state was to institute an “official Islam.” Only a limited number of non-Muslims, excluding Syriacs, were given the right to open religious schools.

Turkish nationalism perceived ethnic and religious minorities, including Christians, as a threat to the ideal of a homogeneous Turkish nation. In the early years of the Republic, Turkey and Greece had large-scale population exchanges in an effort to homogenize their respective societies. Turkish Muslims in Western Thrace moved to Turkey while Greek Christians in Istanbul moved to Greece. In later years when nationalism peaked, the status of minorities including Christians worsened. For example, in the late 1960s, when Turkey had international problems with Greece over the Cyprus conflict, the state expropriated land and properties owned by Christian community foundations by using simple legal technicalities. Again when Turkey had problems with Greece, Turkey closed down the historical Theological School of Halki, which was opened to train Greek Orthodox clergy under Ottoman rule in 1844. Additionally, due mostly to the nationalist security perceptions of the state, religious minorities faced restrictions in opening up spaces for religious practice.

Only after Turkish secularism and nationalism started to weaken in recent years, the Turkish government implemented new reforms enhancing the religious freedoms of Christian minorities in Turkey. Although many significant problems still exist, the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party has passed several laws to enhance religious liberties for minorities over the last decade. The state passed new laws to return all expropriated properties to non-Muslim community foundations or to compensate the community foundations for properties transferred to third parties. The new laws made it easy to open houses of worship even though some local authorities still keep creating bureaucratic hurdles for non-Muslim minorities.

However, the recent reforms are far from satisfactory. They have not yet offered a solution to many problems that Christian minorities face. Religious communities still do not exist legally and they cannot establish religion-based associations and organizations. Similarly, religious groups cannot open educational institutions to teach religion. The Theological School of Halki, for example, is still closed.

The only comprehensive solution to these problems is to redefine Turkish secularism to make it more inclusive. Secularism in its current form is used as an ideological tool to guarantee state control of religion. For religious freedoms to thrive, Turkish secularism should be transformed into a constitutional principle that guarantees religious freedoms while keeping religion out of the control of the state. This change will prevent the state from intervening in the internal affairs of religious communities including Christian minorities. A change that allows an autonomous sphere to religious minorities would also bring them legal guarantees. While it is true that the current government in Turkey is more tolerant of Christian minorities than its predecessors, Turkey still needs a legal framework that protects the freedoms of Christian minorities. Only a transformation of Turkish secularism could make such a legal framework possible.



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